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1. Introduction  
 
In 2002, the media began to carry stories that Americans were engaging in torturing a large number 
of prisoners at the Guantánamo Bay naval base. At first the American government denied that 
torture methods were being used on prisoners, but soon they had to admit that some torture was 
used as “enhanced interrogation techniques” to obtain information from terrorists and other 
prisoners (Fletcher, 2008, p.4). The Justice Department advised the White House that torturing 
“may be justified” for interrogations conducted in the war on terrorism (Washington Post, 2002).  
 In this paper, I unravel the nature of torture and show its close relation to spying. By using 
the phenomenology of Jean-Paul Sartre, I argue that torture is a reaction to the look of the other 
who reveals my bodily existence. Sartre unfolds his account of the recognition of the other as a sort 
of voyeurism which is motivated by the mere possibility of the other to look at me.  
 Sartre argues in L’Etre et le Néant (1943) that humans are ontologically inclined to use 
strategies such as torture and sadism in reaction to the gaze of the other. However, Sartre argues 
that these attitudes are all “acts of bad faith” because they have their origin in man’s refusal to take 
up his existence as for-itself (pour-soi). ).In this paper, I will argue that spying at the other and 
torture are rooted in man’s denial of his nature as for-itself and his desire to be a for-itself-in-itself.  
 . The human cogito is inclined to mask its nature as absolute freedom which results in a 
violation of the other’s freedom as well as one’s own. Torture does not only harm the victims’ 
freedom, but prevents as well the torturer from exercising his absolute freedom.  
 The key to understanding bad faith as a threat to human freedom is the tendency of the 
human cogito to take up his nothingness as a loss of being. Man tries to overcome his nothingness 
by trying to be. Man’s desire to be prevents him to be what he is; a nothingness that cannot be but is 
always a becoming-to-be.  
 To Sartre, the human cogito is synonym with absolute freedom. Existential fear however 
prevents man from exercising this absolute freedom and makes man prone to acts of bad faith. Bad 
faith has its origin in man’s refusal to take up his own existence as for-itself or by man’s denial to 
assume his facticity as his own.  
 Sartre’s ontology of bad faith which he outlines in l’Etre et le Néant, shapes his theory of 
the recognition of another human freedom. Sartre describes the encounter of the other as the 
objectifying event in which the look (or gaze) of the other alienates man from his absolute freedom 
and makes him dependent on the other for his self-awareness.  
 Sartre distinguishes two attitudes in reaction to the gaze of the other which are of direct 
interest to this paper. Man can either appropriate that what the other reveals of him or he can deny 
that the other has the possibility to look at him and reveal his bodily existence. Because of the focus 
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on torture, I will concentrate on the second attitude in reaction to the gaze. Sartre argues that the 
denial of the capacity of the other to reveal something of man, leads to “distinct acts of hate, sadism 
and indifference” (Sartre, 1943, p. 420).  
 Sartre shows us that torture has its origin in the gaze of the other. Spying and voyeurism are 
innate to the relation to the other as another subjectivity. Interesting is that torture is related to the 
gaze of the other and to spying as such. It is the capability of the other to look at us which causes 
unease and may result in violent acts such as sadism and torture.  
 The ontological relation to the other shows us as well that these acts of torture and violence 
all seem to fail because they limit the absolute freedom of the victim as well as the offender. The 
culprit is man’s ontological tendency to mask his nature as for-itself which makes him prone to acts 
of bad faith. The torturer denies the victim’s subjectivity and treats him as a mere object. This 
attitude is bound to fail, because we can never escape from  the look.  
 For Sartre, acts of bad faith such as torture are rooted in man’s fear of dealing with his own 
nature as for-itself. Sadism and torture stem from existential fear and are a reaction to the power of 
the look of the other. Torture is therefore more than a mere method for obtaining information; it 
reveals man’s nature and its existential Dasein. 
 
2. The structure of the human cogito  
 
The relation to the other is a relation between to absolute freedoms, or cogito’s. For Sartre, there is 
no need to justify individuality, because each consciousness is embodied and as such is already 
individuated. To Sartre, no external cause for individuation is therefore needed.  
 Sartre’s ontology deals with the fundamental difference between the human cogito and a 
mere thing. Consciousness is different than a thing because of its intentionality; the human cogito is 
able to direct itself at phenomena and to become conscious of them. Sartre defines the human cogito 
as “the activity of directing itself at something which is different than it” (Sartre, 1943, p. 25).  
 Edmund Husserl made it possible to take the cogito as the starting point of philosophy 
without falling into the pitfall of idealism. Being conscious is being conscious of something. The 
cogito is intentional, which means that it can go beyond itself and direct itself tot that which is 
outwards.  
 For Sartre, consciousness is essentially a negating activity because it experiences that which 
it is conscious of as something-which-it-is-not. Even when consciousness is conscious of itself, it 
experiences itself as something that it is not. To Sartre, the distinctive characteristic of 
consciousness is that it is a nothingnes; it is through the human cogito that nothingness is 
introduced in the world: “the being through which nothingness enters into the world needs to negate 
nothingness in its being.” (Sartre, 1943, p. 57).  
 The human cogito has the ability to transcend the phenomena by negating them  (néantiser). 
Sartre defines consciousness as “the negating activity that is nothingness and as such is 
synonymous with absolute freedom” (Sartre, 1943, p. 61). The ontological account of the human 
cogito leads to a sharp distinction between human consciousness (defined as a pour-soi) and a mere 
thing (defined as an en-soi); consciousness is a nothingness which never coincides with what it is 
conscious of. The en-soi however totally coincides with itself because it cannot direct itself at 
anything and as such is full or ‘mere being’ (Sartre, 1943, p. 72).  
 Being-conscious is a non-identity or a transparency. Human consciousness has the capability 
to distance itself from what it is conscious of because the human cogito is in itself a nothingness. 
When consciousness is defined as a nothingness, it means that it has the ability to direct itself to 
whatever it wants and can fill itself with whatever it chooses. The human cogito is as a nothingness 
synonym to absolute freedom: “Human reality cannot receive it ends, as we have seen, either from 
outside or from so-called inner ‘nature’. It chooses them and by this very choice confers upon them 
a transcendent existence as the external limits of its projects. From this point of view, - and if it is 
understood that the existence of Dasein precedes and commands its essence-, human reality in and 
through it very upsurge decides to define its own being by its ends. It is therefore the positing of my 
 
 
ultimate ends which characterizes my being and which is identical with the sudden thrust of 
freedom which is mine (Sartre, 1943, p. 443).  
 Consciousness experiences its nothingness as a loss or a lack of being. Man strives every 
time to be and tries to fill himself up with being. Sartre argues that due to his “desire to be”, man 
becomes a “useless passion” because man is anguished over his own absolute freedom and longs for 
the stability of the non-conscious en-soi (Sartre, 1943, p. 65). Anguish captures the nature of 
mankind who is condemned to be free and knows he must decide and that his choices are his and 
his alone.  
 Sartre presents man in l’Etre et le Néant, but also in his novels, as the creature who is 
doomed to be free. Doomed because he cannot escape from the endless task of giving himself 
significance and direction. Man is absolute freedom and is responsible for every choice he makes 
and everything he was or becomes. Sartre even argues that man needs to take up his own 
thrownness in the world (facticity) as his own choice. This means accepting one’s body, gender and 
situation in which one finds himself as part of his project. What Sartre argues is that man is on his 
own in giving himself significance and direction. In this sense; man is doomed to be free; he cannot 
rely on anything outside himself for giving him guidance.  
 Man’s absolute freedom and his responsibility for the situation in which he finds himself is 
something that he will try to mask. Man will often pretend that he is not able to transcend the 
situation (and thus denies that he is absolutely free) or he pretends that he does not have to deal with 
his facticity. Sartre argues that man is ontologically inclined to fall into acts of bad faith (la 
mauvaise foi).  
 Bad faith appears when I for example pretend that the situation in which I find myself makes 
it impossible for me to make a free choice. The “homme sérieux”, as Sartre calls him, acts like he is 
a determined thing that cannot give itself direction.  
 Man also acts out of bad faith when he pretends that his facticity doesn’t affect him. In 
l’Être et le Néant, Sartre gives the example of the young women who has a romantic dinner with a 
man. The man lies his hand on the woman’s hand, but the women refuses to respond to this gesture. 
She pretends that the man’s hand touching her hand doesn’t affect her. The woman acts out of bad 
faith because she refuses to take responsibility for her own facticity.  
 Sartre thus takes the facticity of human life into account as something which man needs to 
accept as his own choice. Humans are born as male or female and are born into a body they did not 
freely choose. All these ‘fixed’ things, as well as the characteristics of the environment in which 
man finds himself, constitute man’s facticity. Sartre’s conception of self-determination is in this 
sense unique and original because it embodies the “necessity of contingency” (Sartre, 1943, p. 327). 
It is necessary that man determines himself but in Sartre’s ontology any determination is contingent 
and has no ultimate meaning.  
 The man who acts out of bad faith acts from an impossibility to choose or to take 
responsibility for his facticity. Man masks in his bad faith his existence as a free individual who has 
to take up his facticity as his own choice. Bad faith not only affects the way man sees himself, but 
also affects the way he encounters another consciousness. Sartre argues that it is the other who 
reveals my objectivity and confronts me with my facticity. 
 
3. The look and the nature of spying (1500 words, 3500 in total) 
 
For Sartre, the original project of man dictates that each act has a meaning in relation to a 
consciousness. Man has to Sartre no fixed meaning or characteristics but rather is a series of acts 
which can be defined as “me” (Sartre, 1943, p. 44). The human cogito defines itself in the face of 
other consciousness. It is the look (or gaze) of the Other which reveals man’s being-for-others.  
 Sartre takes the look of the other as the origin of the relation to the other. The other is first 
and foremost recognized as other because he can see me. Sartre claims that man can experience the 
subjectivity of the other directly by becoming an object for the others. Sartre’s main concern is not 
 
 
with the other’s existence as such, but rather with the role that the other plays in acquainting me 
with my own objectivity.  
 For Sartre, the only possible refutation of solipsism is the conception of the ego. The 
fundamental problem in philosophy of other minds seems to arise because of a fundamental 
disparity between my own conscious mind and that of others. I have a special access to the content 
of my mind in a way I do not have to anyone else’s. But to Sartre, I don’t have this special 
“privileged knowledge” to my own me that I lack to yours. For Sartre, consciousness is 
nothingness; there is thus no closed off “me”. Rather, Sartre constructs personality and that which 
constitutes a “me” as something objective; something which is an object for consciousness. In 
Sartre’s ontological account, the self is nothing more than a sequence of acts and these acts are both 
accessible to me as to the other. For Sartre, all ego’s are tentative objects which are fallible and 
open to discussion. My own self is no more certain to me than it is to you.  
 In l’Etre et le Néant, Sartre devotes a long chapter to the “look” or “gaze” of the other. For 
Sartre, the other-as-other-consciousness is not a subject known through oneself, but is revealed as a 
disruption of oneself. For Sartre, human reality is the absolute power of forming projects and goals 
and in the encounter with the other that other disrupts this absolute power. Man encounters the other 
in a space that is both one’s own. Man apprehends the other as subject by becoming an object for 
that other (Sartre, 1943, p. 259).  
 When man encounters another human being, he experiences this other as a consciousness 
that is not his consciousness. Sartre argues that the relation to the other is defined by the ability to 
be seen by the other (the gaze, le regard). The other can reflect on his being and reveals his 
embodied existence. For Sartre, it is the other who confronts him with his facticity.  
 Through the gaze of the other, one not only becomes aware of the subjectivity of the other, 
but is also confronted with the fact that his consciousness is not only a perspective, but also an 
object within the world. The gaze is the first step towards apprehending the other and thereby the 
self. Sartre argues that: “I see myself because somebody sees me” and “it is shame or pride which 
makes me live” (Sartre, 1943, p. 671). Sartre’s account shows us that it is enough to have been seen 
by another human freedom. The gaze makes us aware of what we are at that moment in our facticity 
and become self-aware.  
 The gaze of the other alienates him from his absolute freedom, because it forces him to take 
responsibility for the being that the other reveals of him.  One must accept that the being that the 
other sees is his being. In looking at me, the other objectifies me and is threatening the freedom of 
my consciousness. In my desire to maintain my absolute freedom, I will try to integrate that which 
is revealed by the other.  
 The confrontation with one’s embodied existence is hard for man, because he must take up 
that which he cannot change, such as gender or body appearance, as part of his situation. Sartre 
argues that man has to take up his facticity as if it was his own choice. If he fails to do this, he will 
fall into acts of bad faith.  
 Sartre describes the process of voyeurism through the example of a voyeur caught looking 
through the keyhole. Before being caught, the viewer is a pure, acting consciousness 
unselfconsciously experiencing the emotions. Once seen, he is turned into something else. Colored 
by a new emotion (share). It is human freedom itself which is undermined by the gaze of the other.  
 Sartre argues that voyeurism or spying is “a pure process of relating to the instrument (the 
keyhole) to the end to be attained (the spectacle to be seen), a pure mode of losing myself in the 
world, of causing myself to be drunk in by things as ink is by a blotter.” (Sartre, 1943, p. 433).  
 Sartre’s gaze does not need to be an actual eye, but has broader applications. For Sartre, it 
could be also the believed presence of the other or the possibility that there is somebody who is 
spying on me. Lacan was particularly interested in this aspect of Sartre’s gaze that is: “not a seen 
gaze, but a gaze imagined by me in the field of the other” as well as the fact that “the other surprises 
him, the subject, as entirely hidden gaze”.  
 




To Sartre, man will approach the other as an object by giving the other meaning and content. In 
gazing at the other, man can only reveal the other’s bodily existence and can only assume that the 
other is another freedom because the other is just as capable at gazing at me.  
 
 
“The lesson of L’Etre et le Néant would seem to be that personal relations are usually warfare, and 
at best represent a precarious equilibrium, buttressed as often as not by bad faith” (Murdoch, p. 59).  
 
“L’essence des rapports entre consciences ce n’est pas le Mit-sein, c’est le conflit.” (Sartre, 1943, p. 
433).  
 
Sartre’s main concern in the encounter with the other is not the experience of the other’s 
subjectivity, but the role the other plays in revealing his objectivity. The gaze reveals his  being-for-
the-other.  
 Sartre distinguishes different attitudes to respond to this being-for-the-other. The concrete 
ontological relations to the other are love, language, masochism, indifference, desire, hate and 
sadism. Love, language and masochism are attitudes that have their origin in the desire to that 
which the other reveals of man. Indifference, desire, hate and sadism are attitudes that deny the 
subjectivity of the other by denying that the other reveals man’s facticity. I pretend that the other is 
a mere object that does not reflect on one’s being. Sartre argues that the concrete relations all result 
in violence and oppression. 
 In love for example, we try to be that which the other reveals of us. We try to live up to our 
lover’s expectations in order to gain their love. The assumption that we can be what the other sees 
in us is, however, an illusion. As absolute freedom, we never are, but are always a becoming-to-be. 
We can never possess the quality that the other ascribes to us. In love, we are not only fooling 
ourselves by pretending that we can possess fixed qualities, but we also treat the other as an object 
by forcing him to love us: 
 
Ainsi l’amant demande le serment et s’irrite du serment. Il veut être aimé par une liberté et réclame 
que cette liberté comme liberté ne soit plus libre. Il veut à la fois que la liberté de l’autre se 
détermine elle-même à devenir amour – et cela, non point seulement au commencement de 
l’aventure mais à chaque instant – et, à la fois, que cette liberté soit captivée par elle-même, qu’elle 
se retourne sur elle-même, comme dans la folie, comme dans le rêve, pour vouloir sa captivité. 
 
In love, man has made himself dependent on the other and masks the fact that he needs to give 
himself significance and direction. The loving relationship Sartre depicts here is essentially an act 
of bad faith; man tries to be something he is not. Man needs to give himself significance and cannot 
rely on the other in order to escape from this task.  
 Sartre argues that “language” is the attitude in which I appropriate the other ones point of 
view. In this attitude, man has turned himself to “the language of objectivity.” In this attitude, one 
tries to adopt the significance the other gives to phenomena in order to gain his love. Language, just 
as love, is doomed to fail; the more one tries to adopt the significance the other gives to phenomena 
in order to make him love, the more one will loose himself and the more the other will slip away.  
 Masochism is the torturing effort to be against all odds. In masochism, one gives up his 
freedom in order to gain the other ones love and make himself — in every aspect of his existence — 
dependent on the other.  
 Love, language and masochism are attitudes that result from the desire to appropriate the 
being the other reveals of him. In these relations, we trying to assume the other’s subjectivity by 
making ourselves dependent on him. These relations result in a total alienation of our consciousness 
as for-itself.  For Sartre, man is of bad faith when he pretends that he can escape his task of giving 
 
 
himself significance by relying on something outside of him. The gaze of the other alienates him 
from his freedom and keeps him hostage. 
 Indifference, desire, hate and sadism result from the second reaction to the gaze, which 
Sartre distinguishes. These attitudes refuse to acknowledge that the other is another consciousness 
that reveals one’s facticity. Sartre argues that these attitudes are essentially the refusal to take 
responsibility for man’s facticity. 
 Indifference is the denial that the other has the capability of revealing one’s objectivity. For 
example, I treat the other as a thing that cannot reflect on my being.. In relation to terrorism, 
indifference can be related to the colonist who occupies a certain territory and denies the special 
way of living of the natives who have their own tradition and history.  
 The second attitude that characterizes the denial of the other ones subjectivity is desire. 
Desire has a sexual connotation; it is an attempt to possess the other’s body in order to ignore his 
subjectivity. Sartre argues that desire is the “original attempt to possess the free subjectivity of the 
other by using his objectivity-for-me.” Desire is directed at using the other one’s facticity, but at the 
same time emphasizes man’s own embodied existence. In desire, one tries to possess the other ones’ 
body by using his own body. An example of desire is war rape. War rapes and rape by soldiers are 
attitudes of desire; they have a sexual connotation and are directed at gaining power of the other 
one’s subjectivity. The other one’s subjectivity is mastered by using one’s own body.  
 Desire is frequently combined with hate.  
 Hate is despising the way the other is. Despising the other for what he is or for what he 
looks like is denying the fact that the other is not a thing with determined qualities but absolute 
freedom. Sartre argues that hate — which is for example the underlying feeling of racism — is 
fundamentally a masking of one’s own failure. Hate is directed at the way the other one is, but is 
driven by the failing attempt to incorporate the other in one’s own projects. An example of hate is 
the religious terrorist who kills people because the world does not seem to acknowledge the truth of 
his religious conviction. Hate is masking the fact that one must take responsibility for the whole 
situation, including the acknowledgement that his projects are not being realized.  
 Sadism is the last attitude Sartre distinguishes. It is the effort to annihilate the other’s 
subjectivity by inflicting pain on his body. The sadist is exhilarated by controlling the subject as an 
object. The torture at Guantanamo Bay is an example of sadism. Torture is inflicting bodily pain in 
order to master the other’s freedom. Just like hate, sadism has its origin in the confrontation with 
the fact that life is permeated with failure and that one’s projects are sometimes frustrated. Sadism 
is masking one responsibility for this fact of human life. 
 The concrete relations of love, language, masochism, indifference, desire, hate and sadism 
are all paradoxical in their nature. In love, language and masochism one tries to gain the love of a 
free consciousness by forcing him to love and by forcing dependence on the other. For example, I 
give up my freedom and keep the other hostage by tricking him into loving me. Indifference, desire, 
hate and sadism are directed at denying the other’s subjectivity by using his body. In these attitudes 
man treats the other as nothing more than a body by using his own body. These attitudes have their 
origin in the refusal to take responsibility for one’s own facticity.  
 The concrete relations to the other result in conflict and oppression. The concrete relations 
are either directed at giving up one’s own freedom in order to gain the love of the other as freedom, 
or are directed at destroying the other’s  freedom by abusing one’s own freedom. Both reactions 
result in undermining one’s own nature as consciousness that must take up its facticity as its own 
choice. Sartre argues that there is no other way of approaching the other in the ontological sphere; 
they all result in objectification and alienation.  
 In Sartre’s analysis, the concrete attitudes are all acts of bad faith. In the concrete attitudes 
towards the other, man masks the nature of consciousness as for-itself that has to take responsibility 
for his embodied existence. The reactions to the gaze of the other are fundamentally perverted 
because they are all grounded in either denying the transcendental nature of consciousness or a 
refusal to take responsibility for man’s facticity.  
 
 
 Based on Sartre’s analysis of the gaze and the concrete relations to the other, we can define 
what Sartre means by oppression. Oppression is objectifying the other by not taking into account 
that the other is another consciousness that can reflect on one’s own being. Oppression can also be 
the result of denying one’s absolute freedom by making one dependent on the other. For example, I 
pretend in this latter case that the other can give me guidance and significance. Oppression has its 
origin in the anxiety for man’s infinite task to give himself direction and significance and taking up 
his facticity as his own choice.  
 For Sartre, an oppressor acts always out of bad faith. An oppressor tries to mask the 
fundamental nature of human existence. Because oppression has its origin in masking the nature of 
human existence, it is destructive. Sartre argues in Situations V that oppression such as colonialism, 
is always doomed to fail: 
 
We, the people of mainland France, have only one lesson to draw from these facts: colonialism is in 
the process of destroying itself. But it still fouls the atmosphere. It is our shame; it mocks our laws 
or caricatures them. It infects us with its racism; as the Montpellier episode proved the other day, it 
obliges our young men to fight despite themselves and die for the Nazi principles that we fought 
against ten years ago; it attempts to defend itself by arousing fascism even here in France. Our role 
is to help it to die. Not only in Algeria but wherever it exists. 
 
 
In the introduction to Frantz Fanon’s book, Sartre argues that the only choice an Algerian has left to 
overcome the French oppression is to kill the Europeans. This statement can be understood from the 
ontological relation to the other. 
 An oppressor denies that the other has the power to reveal one’s own objectivity and treats 
the other as a thing. In order to fight oppression, the other sees only two options: either he may 
adopt the being-for-the-other and become the oppressor’s slave, or he may deny the subjectivity of 
the oppressor by reducing him to a mere thing. These two options however do not result in 
regaining one’s own freedom; as long as the oppressor denies seeing one as another consciousness, 
he can never be truly free. I believe that it is in this sense that Sartre argues that killing is the only 
option available to the Algerians.  
 Sartre argues that it is our role as the oppressors to overcome this act of bad faith. We must 
give up trying to objectify the other and must take up our own facticity in an authentic way.  The 
question is how we can escape from acts of bad faith if Sartre does not give us any alternative in 
approaching the other. It seems to be impossible to respect the other as free consciousness without 
alienating ourselves or objectifying the other. 
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